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In the following paragraphs, I am argu-
ing that rejecting inequality, even when
it means sacrificing available resources,
could be interpreted as a default response
that occurs when there is no other rea-
son to choose otherwise. Moreover, I am
reviewing some of our latest findings sug-
gesting that emotions might not be the
sole mechanism that ultimately explains
this response, as claimed instead by the
most accredited account (e.g., Sanfey et al.,
2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006; Crockett
et al., 2008; Tabibnia et al., 2008). The
idea that a 50-50 share is preferred over
other distributions, when there is no rea-
son to support one of the contending
parties, is not new to the psychological
debate: it has been suggested that peo-
ple use equality heuristically, because it
has psychological advantages, such as
being a cognitive simple strategy, easy
to use and to be understood by every-
one, quickly implemented, defensible,
and, moreover, a useful starting point
from which, in case, adjustments can be
made (Messick and Schell, 1992; Messick,
1995). Furthermore, less-equal distri-
butions are consistently rejected more
often among different human populations
(Henrich et al., 2006). The central claim of
Bicchieri’s book The Grammar of Society
(2006) is that an equal-division norm
plays a critical and under-appreciated role
in driving behavior in bargaining games
(Bicchieri, 2006; Nichols, 2010). Research
in the field of behavioral economics has
demonstrated that the model of homo
economicus often fails to predict human
behavior: the Ultimatum Game (UG)
(Güth et al., 1982), a widely employed tool
to investigate socio-economic decision-
making, perfectly shows how people do
not always make decisions driven by the
principle of maximizing monetary payoff.
In this game, a proposer has to share some
money with a responder, who can either
accept or reject the offer: if he accepts,
the money is divided as the proposer has
established, otherwise both of them get
nothing. To maximize their payoffs, the
proposer should offer the smallest amount
of money, and responder should always
accept, as even one is better than zero.
However, numerous findings show that the
proposer tends to make fair offers, around
50% of the share, while the responder
prefers to reject a sure amount of money
rather than accepting an unfair division.
Models of social preferences provide a
formal explanation for the apparently irra-
tional behavior. Two families of theories,
i.e., theories of negative reciprocity (e.g.,
Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006)
and theories of inequality aversion (e.g.,
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) tried to explain
rejections: the former focuses on inten-
tions and describes rejections as a tool to
punish the unfair proposer, whereas the
latter focuses on the outcome and claims
that people are naturally averse to unequal
distributions, especially when disadvan-
tageous. Recently, Tricomi et al. (2010)
found support for this claim, showing
that basic reward brain structures, such
as ventral striatum and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vMPFC), are involved in
both advantageous and disadvantageous
inequity. From a psychological perspec-
tive, negative emotions, such as anger and
frustration, elicited by the unfair treat-
ment, are accounted to cause rejections
(Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996), and a
number of neuroscientific findings sup-
port this hypothesis: for example, van’t
Wout et al. (2006), using the skin con-
ductance response (SCR) as a measure of
emotional activation, reported that people
were more emotionally aroused, showing
a higher SCR when rejecting, as opposed
to accepting, unfair offers. Moreover, areas
known to be involved in emotional con-
trol, such as vMPFC, and in processing
negative emotions, such as anterior insula
(AI), are found also to be activated by
rejections, and not acceptances, of UG
unfair offers (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003;
Koenigs and Tranel, 2007).
However, if it is true that the accounts
described above, i.e., negative reciprocity,
inequality aversion and emotional involve-
ment, explain responder’s behavior in the
standard UG paradigm, it is hard to
develop a psychological interpretation of
broad inequality perception based on the
evidence collected using this standard ver-
sion. First of all, UG is a self-centered task:
perception of unfairness is confounded
with self-serving bias, questioning whether
responder is actually rejecting disadvan-
tageous outcomes rather than a general
idea of unequal division; also, it is unclear
if anger and frustration are elicited by
unfairness or by self-involvement. Second,
the proposer is always the source of the
unfair division confounding outcome and
intentions concerns. Many studies have
addressed the issue of intentions (e.g.,
Sutter, 2007; Falk et al., 2008); in partic-
ular, Blount (1995) compares the rejection
rate of allocations decided by either a per-
son or an algorithm that shares a sum
of money randomly between two players,
finding higher rejection rates in the first
case compared to the second. However, the
demands of this task were different, in that
the experimenter asked the participants to
indicate their expectations on the two dis-
tributions prior to the choice period, and
thismay have biased the responses (Sanfey,
2009). Nonetheless, rejection rate for the
algorithm condition was not zero, con-
firming that outcome still plays a role as
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well. Third, the proposer, who decides how
to allocate the money, always benefits from
one part of the share, thus the respon-
der never faces outcomes which exceed the
50% of the pie, confounding rejections of
unequal outcomes with rejections of dis-
advantageous payoffs, and leaving ques-
tions concerning advantageous inequality
unanswered.
Our research aimed at understand-
ing the nature of a general inequality
aversion, if any, employing manipula-
tions of the traditional UG. First, we
addressed the issue of the self-serving
bias, by asking participants to play as
responders both for themselves (myself-
MS-condition), and on behalf of a third-
party (TP condition), in which their payoff
is not affected by their decision. Borrowing
a famous expression coined by Adam
Smith in his work The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759), this manipulation put
the participant in the condition of the
“impartial spectator,”1 in that the decision
made by the participant affected some-
one else’s pockets; this way, it was possible
to disentangle between the two hypothe-
ses, i.e., rejections and negative emotions
as elicited by the perception of unfairness
itself, or rejections and negative emotions
as related to the fact of being the target
of the unfair division. We employed this
paradigm in two studies: in the first study,
we recorded the behavior, as the percent-
age of rejected offers (RR), and the SCR, to
get a measure of emotional arousal (Civai
et al., 2010), and in the second study we
investigated neural activation by the mean
of functional magnetic resonance (fMRI)
(Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2012). In both
studies, behavioral analysis showed no
difference between MS and TP: specif-
ically, RR was higher for unfair offers,
and decreased as the offers became fairer,
both in MS and in TP. However, behavior
1Although the semantic expression in this context
is appropriate, the concept of impartial specta-
tor as described by Adam Smith in his work The
Theory of Moral Sentiments is different: here, the
author argues that, in order to go beyond our
own presuppositions to judge a situation, we do
not have to rely literally on a third-party impartial
spectator, but rather we have to “remove ourselves,
as it were, from our own natural situation, and
endeavor to view them at a certain distance from
us” (Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
1759, III, I, 2).
dissociated from both psychophysiological
and neural activations. In the first study,
participants were more aroused, showing
higher SCR and higher subjective emo-
tional ratings, when rejecting, compared
to accepting, offers in MS, but not in
TP, where, instead, there was no effect of
response on SCR. These results suggested
that, albeit emotional arousal clearly enters
the decision-making process, it should not
be held as being the only mechanism
that triggers rejections, in that rejections
occurred also when there was no sign of
it. Neuroimaging data of the second study
revealed a dissociation between the medial
prefrontal cortex, specifically associated
with rejections in MS condition, thus con-
firming its role in self-related emotional
responses, and the left AI, associated with
rejections in both MS and TP conditions,
supporting the hypothesis of a role played
by this area in promoting fair behavior also
toward third-parties (Spitzer et al., 2007;
King-Casas et al., 2008). In both studies,
findings in TP condition support the idea
that people are concerned about unfair-
ness among others, as showed by previous
studies (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
In two subsequent studies, we asked
responders to decide whether to accept
or reject allocations made by an external
proposer, which could be either a person
or a random number generator; MS-TP
manipulation wasmaintained. This design
rules out the possibility of using rejec-
tions to punish the source of unfairness;
the idea is that if rejections still occur, then
they have to be driven by the outcome and
not by the unfair intentions. Moreover,
responders were presented with alloca-
tions which were unequal but, at the same
time, advantageous for them, allowing dis-
entangling between decisions on disadvan-
tageous and advantageous inequality. In
both studies, participants rejected unequal
offers, showing to care about the out-
come rather than specifically about the
intentions. In particular, unequal alloca-
tions in TP were mostly rejected, as well as
unequal disadvantageous offers in MS, but
unequal advantageous offers were mostly
accepted (Civai et al., 2012). Imaging
results showed a higher activation of the
MPFC for disadvantageous, as opposed
to advantageous, offers in MS, but not
in TP, and this activation was negatively
correlated with rejections; activation in
the AI, instead, was higher for unequal
offers, both disadvantageous and advan-
tageous, irrespectively of the target (MS
and TP) (Civai et al., 2012). Behavioral
results confirmed that people prefer equal
divisions and care about equality among
third-parties; however, these findings also
suggest that people change their preference
when involved in first person, accepting
inequality when it brings them an advan-
tage on the other player. In terms of neural
activations, the involvement of MPFC in
MS rejections was confirmed; this activa-
tion extended more dorsally with respect
to the MPFC activation found in the pre-
vious imaging study, supporting a recent
account which claims that dorsal MPFC
may be involved in shifting preference
from a default option, represented in this
case by rejecting the outcome, to a new one
(Boorman et al., 2013). Interestingly, AI
was activated by the perception of inequal-
ity, and was by no means related to the
advantageousness of the offer in MS, sup-
porting the idea of a crucial role played
this area in signaling deviations from the
norm, or expected outcome (King-Casas
et al., 2008; Xiang et al., 2013).
In conclusion, our findings support an
account that considers the rejection of
inequality as a cognitive heuristic, a psy-
chological anchor, which is a useful start-
ing point that can be easily adjusted when
salient contextual cues enter the environ-
ment and influence the decision. In our
studies, third-party condition can be con-
sidered as the neutral situation, design-
ing a context in which participants have
no particular reason to accept inequality,
except for maximizing the total payoff; in
this neutral condition, people apply the
simple strategy of equal split. First-person
involvement (MS condition) is a salient
contextual cue that modifies the envi-
ronment and shifts the preference from
50-50 shares to outcomes that favor the
responder. This interpretation is in line
with recent findings about expectations,
which showed that participants are more
prone to reject offers when primed with
expectations of fairness (Sanfey, 2009);
moreover, a formal model that consid-
ers expectations outperforms models of
inequity aversion in predicting behavior
(Chang and Sanfey, 2013). In this frame-
work, expectations can be considered as
the contextual cues that shift preferences
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away from the default 50-50. Interestingly,
it seems that emotional arousal is limited
to disadvantageous unfairness; however,
the rejection of equality norm’s viola-
tion occurs despite the lack of emotional
arousal, suggesting the cognitive nature of
the equal split heuristic. As far as the neu-
ral correlates are concerned, results suggest
that the activation of AI in the UG be
interpreted as a signal of deviation from
an expected outcome (Chang et al., 2013;
Xiang et al., 2013), which is, in this case,
the equal split, rather than just a sign of
emotional arousal; this interpretation also
offers a straightforward and parsimonious
way to account for the variety of cognitive
and emotional tasks in which the AI has
been found to play a role (see Craig, 2009
for a review on the tasks).
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